Trump approves 30-year US-Saudi nuclear deal, opens door to uranium enrichment

The agreement lets US companies build reactors and potentially enrichment facilities in Saudi Arabia, breaking with decades of non-proliferation precedent.

President Donald Trump approved a 30-year, multi-billion dollar civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, allowing US companies led by Westinghouse to build reactors and potentially uranium enrichment facilities in the kingdom. The deal is expected to be signed Wednesday by Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman.

"The agreement helps revitalize the US nuclear industry and strengthens the US-Saudi relationship," Robert Einhorn, a former State Department senior official who advised both Republican and Democratic administrations on non-proliferation, said.

The pact includes a two-year joint study on the commercial feasibility of domestic uranium enrichment. If the study supports it, US companies would build "black box" enrichment facilities that prevent sensitive technology from transferring to Riyadh. If Washington opposes enrichment after the study, Saudi Arabia cannot pursue it independently or with other foreign partners for 10 years. Westinghouse's AP1000 reactors, which generate about 1,100 megawatts each, are the primary technology expected to be deployed.

The agreement decouples nuclear cooperation from Saudi-Israeli normalization, a linkage the Biden administration had pursued. For Westinghouse — owned by Brookfield Asset Management and Cameco — the deal opens a potentially lucrative market in one of the world's largest oil producers, which aims to free up crude for export by generating electricity from nuclear power.

Non-Proliferation Concerns Mount

Saudi Arabia rejected the "gold standard" commitment adopted by the United Arab Emirates in its 2009 nuclear deal to forswear domestic enrichment and reprocessing. The kingdom also declined to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol, which provides enhanced inspection authority.

"The administration did not seriously consider the proliferation risks of the precedent this sets," Kelsey Davenport, director of non-proliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, said. Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nuclear Policy Education Center, was more direct: "Where Saudi goes, the UAE, Turkey and Egypt will follow. Thinking this ends well for everyone is delusional."

Congressional Hurdles and the Iran Factor

The deal faces a high bar for congressional rejection. Lawmakers would need to pass a joint resolution of disapproval, and any presidential veto would require a two-thirds supermajority in both chambers to override. In 2018, then-Senator Marco Rubio — now Trump's Secretary of State — co-sponsored legislation requiring explicit congressional approval for any Saudi nuclear deal, though the bill never reached a vote.

The timing creates a diplomatic tension. The White House is simultaneously pressing Iran to dismantle its nuclear program and surrender enriched uranium stockpiles, while enabling enrichment in Saudi Arabia, Iran's regional rival. Administration officials argue there is no contradiction as long as Saudi facilities operate under effective safeguards.

Investment Angle

For US nuclear companies, the deal represents a structural growth catalyst. Westinghouse stands to gain reactor construction contracts worth billions, while the broader US nuclear supply chain — including reactor component manufacturers and fuel suppliers — could benefit from a multi-decade buildout. However, the non-proliferation controversy introduces regulatory tail risk: if Congress or international bodies impose additional restrictions, project timelines could extend beyond the 30-year agreement horizon. Westinghouse's AP1000 design, already deployed at four units in China and two under construction in Georgia, offers a reference point for cost and schedule expectations.

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.