New trade war book says 72% of voters see tariffs as failure

Trump's tariffs failed to achieve their stated goals while 72% of American voters view them as economically harmful, a new book on trade war strategy argues.

Trump's tariffs on Chinese goods, which climbed to 145 percent by April 2025, failed to curb China's export machine — Beijing posted a record $3.77 trillion in exports last year — while 72 percent of US voters view the levies as economically harmful, according to a new book by Soumaya Keynes and Chad Bown.

"The evidence on tariffs and their effects on industrialization is mixed, but for every Japan or South Korea that used barriers successfully, there are the smoldering examples of Brazilian personal computers or Indian autos," the authors write in "How to Win a Trade War," published by Simon & Schuster.

China's trade surplus reached $1.2 trillion last year, fueled by industrial support that between 2005 and 2019 was six times higher than comparable sectors in OECD countries, the book shows. Global trade and investment restrictions have risen fivefold since 2015. The authors note that tariffs are overwhelmingly paid for by the importing country and have historically had insignificant effects on trade deficits.

The stakes extend beyond bilateral trade: unilateral US tariffs risk backfilling by European and Japanese competitors, while collective Western action would hit China's gross domestic product five to 11 times harder than a solo US decoupling, according to research by Ben Vagle and Stephen Brooks cited in the book.

Historical Echoes in Today's Trade War

The book draws parallels between current tensions and historical precedents. Germany before World War I cornered 90 percent of global production of chemicals and dyes, sparking fears of dependency among Allied powers. In the 1870s, France hiked tariffs 24 percent on its neighbors and forced trade partners to submit to new treaties within six months — a gambit that largely succeeded, much like Trump's Liberation Day approach.

China's state-owned enterprises act as force multipliers in trade conflicts, the authors show. During the 2018 US-China trade war, voluntary curbs by Chinese SOEs depressed trade with the US by an additional 4 percentage points beyond the 8 percent decline induced by Chinese tariffs. Technology theft remains a persistent issue: one in five European companies operating in China in 2025 reported that Chinese firms had stolen their technology.

What Works Instead

The authors argue that tax credits increase productivity 10 times more than grants or loans as industrial-policy tools. When trade barriers are necessary, they should be erected with allies rather than unilaterally — the opposite of the Trump administration's approach. The collective economic weight of the West overmatches China: a sharp decoupling between the West and China would hit China's GDP five to 11 times harder than the US, but less than 1.5 times harder if the US acts alone.

The book leaves open the possibility of using targeted tariffs to reduce critical dependencies in minerals, pharmaceutical ingredients, and semiconductors. But the central message is clear: the playbook recently used in Washington is the wrong one.

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.